Adnan Morina v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-11-2011 
Adnan Morina v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Adnan Morina v. Atty Gen USA" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1271. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1271 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




IMG-118        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-3055 
 ___________ 
 
 ADNAN MORINA, a/k/a ABENE MORINA, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 




 No. 09-3057 
 ___________ 
 
 ADEM MORINA, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
    
___________ 
 
 No. 10-1854 
 ___________ 
 
 ADNAN MORINA, a/k/a ABENE MORINA; ADEM MORINA, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 






 On Petitions for Review of Orders of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency Nos. A097-391-119 & A097-457-942) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 20, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. AND GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 








 Cousins Adnan and Adem Morina petition for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals‟ (“BIA”) decisions upholding the Immigration Judge‟s (“IJ”) denial of their 
respective applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Petitioners also seek review of the BIA‟s 
subsequent decision denying their joint motion to reconsider.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will deny the petitions. 
I. 
 Petitioners are ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.  In September 2003, Adem
1
 entered 
                                                 
1
 We mean no disrespect when we refer to Petitioners by their first names; we do 
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the United States with a fraudulent passport and sought admission under the Visa Waiver 
Program (“VWP”).2  After that request was denied, he applied for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and CAT relief, and was placed in asylum-only proceedings.  Meanwhile, in 
February 2004, Adnan entered the United States without being admitted or paroled.  He 
subsequently was placed in removal proceedings, where he conceded his removability 
and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. 
 Petitioners claimed that they feared returning to Kosovo because Albanian 
extremists with ties to the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (“AAK”) had persecuted 
them on account of their membership in the Democratic League of Kosovo (“LDK”), a 
rival political party.  Their respective cases were ultimately consolidated before the IJ, 
who heard their testimony over the course of several hearings between December 2004 
and August 2006.   
 Petitioners testified as follows.  In 1998, they and their family fled Kosovo in the 
wake of mistreatment by the Serbian government and its armed forces.
3
  After NATO 
                                                                                                                                                             
so solely for ease of identification.   
2
 Under the VWP, aliens from certain countries are permitted to visit the United 
States for 90 days or less without a visa.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a).  Aliens who 
request admission under the VWP agree to waive any challenge to their removal; 
however, they may still apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.   
Shehu v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 482 F.3d 652, 655 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1187(b)).  VWP applicants who apply for asylum, withholding of removal, 
and/or CAT relief are placed in “asylum-only” proceedings, not removal 
proceedings.  See Shehu, 482 F.3d at 655.  
3
 Petitioners testified about the alleged mistreatment they received at the hands of 
the Serbian government in the years leading up to their 1998 flight from Kosovo.  
In denying their respective applications for relief, the IJ found that the Serbian 
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intervened in Kosovo in 1999, Petitioners and their family returned there.  Around that 
same time, Adnan joined the LDK (Adem had joined several years earlier). 
 In September 2000, Petitioners attended a political rally.  On their way home — 
Petitioners lived together, along with many of their family members — AAK supporters 
beat and threatened the two of them and burned their LDK flags.  In February 2001, 
Petitioners received threatening telephone calls after a leader from the LDK visited their 
home.  In May 2001, there was an explosion outside Petitioners‟ house.  They reported 
the explosion to the police, who said that it was “nothing.”  A few days later, Petitioners 
received an anonymous phone call.  The caller stated that the explosion was a warning 
and threatened that each family member would be killed if they continued to support the 
LDK. 
 In June 2001, five or six masked men accosted Adnan and his father on their way 
home from work.  The masked men beat the two of them, and threatened to kill them if 
they continued to support the LDK.  A few months later, a group of masked men broke 
into Petitioners‟ house looking for Adem, who was not there at the time.  The men beat 
Adem‟s father, and stated that they would have killed Adem if he had been home.  In 
light of this incident, Adem went into hiding for several months. 
                                                                                                                                                             
government was no longer in a position to carry out this mistreatment because the 
United Nations had gained control over the region.  On appeal, the BIA explained 
that, “[f]or understandable reasons, [Petitioners] make[] no claim for relief related 
to actions taken by Serbian forces.”  (See Admin. R. at 39, 43.)  Petitioners did not 
challenge this characterization in their motion to reconsider, nor do they do so 




 In August 2002, Adnan‟s father‟s store was attacked by gunfire.  Adnan and his 
father, who were inside the store at the time but escaped unharmed, received a 
threatening phone call the next day.  A few months later, two men beat Adem on his way 
to the train station, injuring his ear.  In April 2003, Adem was again accosted by two 
men, who beat him and threatened that, if he did not leave Kosovo, he would be buried 
there. 
 In July 2003, a group of masked men abducted Adem.  They placed a bag over his 
head and drove around for approximately thirty minutes, during which time they beat and 
threatened him.  They then threw Adem from the car, removed the bag, placed a gun in 
his mouth, and told him that he was about to die.  Adem begged for his life, and the men 
proceeded to beat him until he passed out.  The men were gone when he awoke, so he 
went home and began making plans for his departure from Kosovo.  He left shortly 
thereafter. 
 Around that same time, Adnan and his father were also abducted by a group of 
masked men.  The men forced Adnan and his father into separate cars and proceeded to 
beat them.  The men threatened that they would kill the two of them if they continued to 
support the LDK.  The men then threw Adnan and his father out of the cars, continued to 
beat them, and put a gun to Adnan‟s head.  The men ultimately let the two of them go, 
and Adnan left Kosovo two days later. 
 Petitioners testified that they and their family members in Kosovo — with the 
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possible exception of one relative — are no longer members of the LDK.  Petitioners did 
not allege that the family had received additional threats since their departure from 
Kosovo, or that the Albanian extremists were looking for the two of them. 
 In December 2006, the IJ denied Petitioners‟ respective applications.  The IJ found 
that Petitioners each lacked credibility, and that Adnan‟s claims did not rise to the level 
of past persecution.  The IJ further found that the conditions in Kosovo had 
fundamentally changed since Petitioners‟ departure, noting that the LDK and AAK had 
entered into a ruling coalition in October 2004.  The IJ also rejected Petitioners‟ 
argument that they would be tortured by, or with the acquiescence of, the government 
upon their return to Kosovo, noting that the LDK was the most popular political party in 
Kosovo.  As a result, the IJ ordered Adnan‟s removal and returned Adem‟s case to the 
Department of Homeland Security. 
 Petitioners appealed the IJ‟s decision to the BIA, which addressed their respective 
cases in separate (but similar) decisions.  The BIA rejected the IJ‟s adverse credibility 
determinations, concluding that they were “based on improper speculation and 
inconsistencies that are either not fully supported by the record or have been reasonably 
explained by [Petitioners].”  (Admin. R. at 40, 44.)  The BIA agreed with the IJ, however, 
that Adnan‟s claims did not rise to the level of past persecution and that, even if he and 
Adem had suffered past persecution, fundamental changes had occurred in Kosovo that 
rebutted any presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.  The BIA further 
concluded that Petitioners had not otherwise established a well-founded fear of future 
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persecution, for they were no longer members of the LDK, and there was no evidence 
that Albanian extremists in Kosovo had harmed their family since their departure or were 
looking for them.  Finally, the BIA held that Petitioners had not established that they 
would likely be tortured by, or with the acquiescence of, the government in Kosovo. 
 Petitioners timely filed a joint petition for review.  Because the BIA had issued 
separate decisions, the Clerk docketed Adnan‟s and Adem‟s respective cases separately 
(C.A. Nos. 09-3055 and 09-3057, respectively).  Meanwhile, in July 2009, Petitioners 
jointly moved the BIA to reconsider its June 2009 decisions.  In February 2010, the BIA, 
in a single decision, denied the motion on the merits, finding “no basis to reconsider our 
June 17, 2009, decision[s].”  (Admin. R. at 3.)  Petitioners then timely filed a petition for 
review of that decision, and the Clerk docketed this new petition at C.A. No. 10-1854.  
The Clerk subsequently granted the Government‟s unopposed motion to consolidate the 
three cases, and they are now ripe for disposition. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over the instant petitions pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
4
 
We review the agency‟s factual findings, including its conclusions concerning evidence 
of past persecution and a well-founded fear of persecution, for substantial evidence.  See 
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 Our jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(1) is limited to the review of “final order[s] of 
removal.”  Although Adem was not in removal proceedings, we nonetheless have 
jurisdiction to review his claims because, as we have previously explained, “a 
denial of a VWP applicant‟s petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
relief under the CAT constitutes „a final order of removal‟ within the meaning of 
[§ 1252(a)(1)].”  Shehu, 482 F.3d at 656. 
8 
 
Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under this deferential standard 
of review, we may not disturb the agency‟s findings “unless the evidence not only 
supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-
84 (3d Cir. 2001).  We review the agency‟s denial of Petitioners‟ motion to reconsider for 
abuse of discretion, see Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005), and must 
uphold that decision unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Id. (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).   
 To obtain asylum, an alien must show that he is unable or unwilling to return to 
the country in question “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b).  A showing of past 
persecution creates a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(b)(1).  That presumption is rebutted, however, if the Government establishes, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that “[t]here has been a fundamental change in 
circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in 
the [country in question].”  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), (ii).     
 In this case, even if Petitioners could establish past persecution, substantial 
evidence supports the agency‟s determination that the changed circumstances in Kosovo 
rebut any presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution, and that Petitioners have not 
otherwise demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution.  As the BIA 
highlighted, the political landscape in Kosovo has changed since Petitioners‟ departure, 
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with the AAK — whose supporters Petitioners claim to fear — forming a ruling coalition 
with the LDK.  Additionally, Petitioners‟ family members in Kosovo — with the possible 
exception of one relative — are no longer members of the LDK, and there is no 
indication that the family has continued to experience any of the earlier troubles 
highlighted by Petitioners.  Moreover, Petitioners themselves are no longer members of 
the LDK, further lessening the possibility that they would be harmed if they returned to 
Kosovo. 
 Because Petitioners cannot satisfy the standard for asylum, they cannot meet the 
higher standard for withholding of removal.  See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 
182 (3d Cir. 2003).  Additionally, they have not shown that the evidence compels a 
finding that either one of them would likely be tortured by, or with the acquiescence of, 
the government in Kosovo.  Finally, Petitioners have failed to establish that the BIA 
abused its discretion in denying their motion to reconsider.
5
 
 Having reviewed the record, we are confident that, contrary to Petitioners‟ 
contention, the BIA properly considered all of the record evidence in reaching its 
decisions.  Accordingly, and in light of the above, we will deny the petitions for review. 
                                                 
5
 Petitioners argue that “the BIA inexplicably departed from established standards 
for [reviewing a] motion to reconsider in denying Petitioners‟ motion on the 
ground that Petitioners did not submit[] new evidence in support of the motion.”  
(Pet‟rs‟ Supplemental Br. 20.)  This argument lacks merit, for the BIA denied the 
motion not because Petitioners failed to provide new evidence, but because they 
did not establish a basis for disturbing the BIA‟s earlier decisions.  Nor do we 
agree with the Petitioners‟ contention that the BIA simply “disregarded” their 
motion. 
